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Abstract
We examine the relationship between the incidence of workplace deviance (on-the-job crime) and
the state of the economy. A worker’s probability of future employment depends on whether she has
been deviant as well as on the availability of jobs. Using a two period model we show that the net
impact on deviant behavior to changes in unemployment can go either way depending upon the
nature of the equilibrium. Two kinds of equilibria are possible. In one, a non-deviant’s probability
of being employed increases as expected market conditions improve which lowers the incentive to be
a deviant. In contrast, in the other kind of equilibrium, the deviant’s probability of being employed
increases when market conditions improve which increases the incentive to be a deviant. In either
case, there is a setup cost to deviant behavior and the attractiveness of incurring that increases
with an increase in expected probability of future employment which unambiguously increases the
incentive to be deviant. In the first kind of equilibrium, the two eﬀects counteract each other,
while in the second they reinforce each other. Finally, we characterize conditions under which
an increase in optimism, i.e. a reduction in the probability of facing a recession unambiguously
increases deviant behavior.
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Introduction
In this paper we examine whether there is any relationship between workplace deviance (on-

the-job crime) and the state of the economy i.e. does such behavior increase or decrease with the
anticipation of a recession? This "deviant behavior" could be in the form of shirking at work,
stealing from the firm, sabotage, harassing other workers etc. Deviant behavior has consequences
for a firm’s profitability. Further, while a deviant employee enjoys current benefits from such
behavior, it aﬀects her future employment prospects if caught. Currently, there is no consensus in
the literature about whether deviant behavior in the workplace increases or decreases with the state
of the economy, nor is there a cogent theoretical framework to analyze such behavior.1 Popular
newspaper accounts suggest that the recent recession may have increased employee theft. For
instance an article by Needleman (2008) in the Wall Street Journal suggests employee theft has
increased in the recession. In the UK, KPMG’s fraud barometer (KPMG (2010)) for January 2010
shows employee fraud in book keeping and accounting on the rise in the recent recession. However,
one of the few scholarly studies on employee theft (Rickman and Witt (2005)) shows strong evidence
of employee theft decreasing as unemployment increased in the U.K. for the period 1999-2000. This
suggests that the answer to the question may well depend on the nature or severity of recession
and there could well be opposing forces at work in a recession. Further, (as we elaborate below)
shirking which is another measure of workplace deviance also does not appear to unambiguously
increase or decrease with recession. In order to provide an answer to this question, we build a
dynamic model which analyzes how the current market condition as well as expectations about
future market conditions aﬀect the intertemporal tradeoﬀs that people make in deciding how to
behave in their current workplace.
We treat workplace deviance as a type of on-the-job crime committed by rational criminal
economic agents who derive benefit from their deviant behavior but incur costly sanctions if caught.
Thus, we can analyze it using the framework in Becker’s (1968) analysis of crime, though as we
1

There is an introductory discussion in Cook and Zarkin (1985) on the ambiguous relationship between crime and
the business cycle. They also provide some empirical evidence that the relationship between crime and the business
cycle is counter-cyclical. However, their analysis does not specifically deal with on-the-job crime or labor eﬀort. There
has also been some work on the long run relationship between crime and the business cycle using U.K. time series
data e.g., Pyle and Deadman (1994) but not for on-the-job crimes.
There is also some literature using an experimental set up of sabotage in the workplace (Harbring and Irlenbusch
(2010)) when relative performance is used to evaluate workers.

1

discuss, the framework would need to be extended to take into account expectations about future
market conditions. To see this, recall that in a standard Beckerian model, if people can choose
between work and crime, the impact of unemployment increases crime as it lowers the opportunity
cost of crime.2 However, when we modify the model to take account of the fact that people can both
work and commit crime which is what we need to consider when analyzing workplace deviance,
the state of the economy plays no role in a standard static framework. Instead, workplace deviant
behavior is entirely determined by the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment.
However, once we take into account that being caught in deviant behavior has implications for
future employment, the state of the economy plays an important role, albeit a complex one.
To see this, we note two eﬀects that act in opposite directions-deviant behavior today causes
lowered chances of employment tomorrow but employment prospects additionally also depend on
the general state of the economy tomorrow. Intuitively, if the general state of the economy is such
that employment prospects are bleak in the future, loss of employment may not act as much of a
deterrent and thus people would commit more on-the-job crime (including shirking) when expecting
an economic downturn as the opportunity cost of such behavior goes down with a lowered expected
wage in the labor market. However, working against that is the fact that when jobs have to be cut,
managers may fire the least productive workers, that is, workers with "bad" records may find it
harder to get jobs in a recession which makes the marginal value of abstaining from deviant behavior
higher in a tight labor market. Further, indulging in workplace crime may incur a setup cost and
may be worth paying only if the potential criminal has a chance to benefit from incurring this one
time cost. The direction of the net eﬀect is thus far from clear and we identify two types of regimes
where there are diﬀerent impacts of future market conditions on current workplace behavior. Thus
we identify how the state of the economy aﬀects firm profitability not only through well recognized
channels such as the strength of demand, wage rates etc. but also through its eﬀect on workplace
behavior.
While there are no precise estimates of workplace deviance, the empirical evidence on labor
eﬀort and the state of the economy is mixed. Some papers find empirical evidence that labor eﬀort
2

Becker’s work has been extended to examine several aspects of crime such as examining how economic and law
enforcement factors aﬀect crime, including the possibility of multiple equilibria as in Sah (1991), Fender (1999) and
Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003, 2004). There has also been some empirical analysis of crime and unemployment
(though without specific reference to on-the-job crime) such as Carmichael and Ward (2000, 2001), Doyle and Ahmed
(1999) and Han, Bandyopadhyay and Bhattacharya (2013).
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increases in a recession (e.g. Franke and Kaul (1978), Stern and Friedman (1980), Wadhwani and
Wall (1991), Drago and Heywood (1992), and Agell (1994)). Others, such as Spitz (1993) find
no such relationship. Surveys conducted on managers give contradictory findings. Some believe
that shirking goes down during a recession while others believe that it goes up. In an interview
of 47 businesses undertaken by Bewley (1999), it was found that 42% believed labor eﬀort goes
up during a recession, while 15% believed it goes down and 42% believed it has no impact. The
closest data we have on deviant behavior would be data on recorded employee theft. In a study
of employee theft in the U.K., Rickman and Witt (2007) find that increases in the unemployment
rate decrease employee theft. These contradictory findings on deviant behavior suggests the need
to build a theoretical framework to provide a precise answer to the question.
We consider a model where the economy can be in a good state (boom) or a bad state (recession).
Given the state of the economy, there is a probability distribution over the future state of the
economy. Further, we assume that the prospects of employment depend on (a) the state of the
economy and (b) one’s past record. During a boom, more people are employed, so an employer
may have to employ people even with a "bad" record, while during a recession the employer can
aﬀord to be more selective. This bad record can be in the form of having been caught shirking
or committing an on-the-job crime including sabotage and harassing other employees. Formally,
any kind of deviant behavior which will lead to a "bad" history and sanctions if caught is what
we call crime. Thus while crime has benefits, it has costs in terms of sanctions if caught and a
lowered probability of future employment. Further, a career in crime has set up costs, so a first
time criminal additionally faces a one time fixed cost.
The current state and expectations about the future state are parameters in the model and determine current and future employment. The probability of getting a job from any state to another
is however endogenously determined as it depends on current behavior. Further, current behavior
in turn determines the crime rate in period 1, which determines the probability of employment in
period 2. We assume for simplicity that everyone is employed in a boom, and that only a fraction
of the population is employed during a recession; the severity of the recession is measured by labor
demand in a recession. A more severe recession is associated with lower labor demand. Our results
depend on the characteristics of the equilibrium, and in particular, we find that three possible types
of regimes can exist. In one type of equilibrium (Regime 1), only a fraction of people with an un3

blemished record can find jobs in a recession. Everyone else is unemployed in that case. In another
type of equilibrium (Regime 2), all people with an unblemished record find jobs in a recession as
do a fraction of currently unemployed people. Finally, in the third type of equilibrium (Regime 3),
even a fraction of workers with a bad record get jobs. We analyze what happens when the severity
of recession increases, both for small shifts (which does not change the equilibrium regime) as well
as for large shifts (which can change the regime). Changes in expectations i.e. changes about the
probability of facing a future recession is also analyzed.
We provide an intuitive discussion of our main results. The impact of increased severity of
recession (in terms of a lowered probability of finding a job if there is a recession tomorrow) in
period 2 on the incentive to commit crime in period 1 depends on the proportion of the workers
with a bad record (which is an endogenous variable in our model). Suppose in case of a recession
tomorrow, the equilibrium is regime 1 i.e., a situation where in a recession, no one with a criminal
record finds a job, but even some employed people without a criminal record cannot find jobs.
Given such an equilibrium, any worsening of the severity of the recession (while staying in regime
1) increases the incentive to commit crime in period 1. Since a person with a bad record is anyway
not hired in this case, therefore, any change in the severity of the recession will not have any impact
on her behavior. However, a change in the severity matters to a person who has a good record, since
such a person has a lower likelihood of being employed in a more severe recession. Thus, an increase
in the severity of a recession reduces the incentive to maintain a good record. Consequently, the
incentive to commit crime should be higher in this case. This is similar to what is predicted by the
standard Becker model.
However, it is also possible that the anticipated equilibrium is regime 3. In this case, all people
without a criminal record get a job, but some people with a criminal record also get a job. In this
case, an increase in the severity of a recession has an opposite eﬀect. Since people with a good
record get a job anyway, therefore, any change in the severity of the recession does not aﬀect their
behavior. However, a tightening of the labor market reduces the probability of people with bad
records of getting a job. This in turn lowers the incentive to commit crime as the marginal value
of staying crime free (and thus having a clean record) increases. This goes against the standard
Beckerian result as the future value of staying crime free is higher in a tighter labor market where
employers can be more selective about who to hire. In regime 2 there is no net impact as the
4

changes in employment aﬀect only the employment prospect of the currently unemployed and not
of those employed in period 1.
The setup cost always reduces the incentive to commit crime if the labor market is expected
to tighten in the future and will counteract the first eﬀect in regime 1 but reinforce it in regime 3.
Thus, in regimes 2 and 3, the net incentive to commit crime goes down with anticipated recession,
while in regime 1 it can go either way.
Our results diﬀer both from the theoretical prediction in the standard Becker (1968) model
which implies that crime increases with an increase in unemployment as well as the theoretical
(and empirical) prediction in Rickman and Witt (2007) who on the contrary find that the rate of
unemployment has a negative relationship with the crime rate. Once one accounts for the future
consequences of crime and trades it oﬀ against current profitability, the relationship between deviant
behavior and the unemployment rate (or the severity of the recession) could be positive or negative
depending on the type of recession.
In the context of the recent recession, there has been some discussion about policies that could
increase confidence in the economy. This paper does not deal with such policies but it can rather
be used to determine the impact on workplace discipline if there is an increase in optimism about
the future3 . Our model predicts that an increase in optimism i.e. a decrease in the probability of
recession in period 2 (holding the severity of recession constant) always increases the incentive to
commit crime in period 1 as long as nearly everyone gets a job in a boom. Thus, there is a diﬀerence
in the predicted impact of a change in the severity of the recession vs. a change in the degree of
optimism. The impact of the former can vary depending on the character of the equilibrium, while
the impact of the latter stays the same regardless of the nature of the equilibrium provided that
people with bad records gain more relative to people without one.
We set up the model in the next section, solve for period 2 equilibrium in section 3, and analyze
the incentive to commit crime in period 1 in section 4. Section 5 endogenizes the decision making
process of firms and section 6 concludes.
3

Political leaders the world over have been asked to restore business confidence so that it begins to hire workers.
For example, in the U.K. the Federation of Small Businesses (2011) point out that business confidence has fallen and
suggest various policies to restore confidence.
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2

The Model
This is a two period model4 ( = 1 2) with two possible states  ∈ { } during each period

with  representing a boom and  representing a recession or bust. Further, the state in period 1
determines the probability of the state in period 2. In particular, let  0 be the probability that
the state in period 2 is 0 , given that the state in period 1 is . For example, if the state in period
1 is , then the probability of the state being  in period 2 is   , and the probability of the
state being  in period 2 is   . It follows that,

  +   = 1 for  = { } .
There are a large number of potential workers in our model. We denote the employment status
of a person in period  by an indicator variable Ω that takes a value 1 if the person is employed
in period  and takes a value of 0 otherwise. At the end of a period, an employed person receives
a wage  if the state is . Further, in the spirit of several models of the labor market such as
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we assume that wages are lower in a recession, that is  ≤  .5
We denote labor demand in state  by  . Further, we assume that

 = 1

while
05    1.
Hence, by assumption, no one is unemployed during a boom, while a fraction (1 −  ) is unemployed
during a recession.6

7

Since the focus of the paper is to explain why the level of deviant behavior

in the workplace may be non-monotonically related to the severity of the recession (as opposed to
4
While the two period formulation is a simplification, it suﬃces for our purpose as our aim is to study the way
current crime decisions are aﬀected by the fear of loss of future employment prospects and adding more time periods
while adding complexity should not change our qualitative findings.
5
The question of how to use wages or compensation contracts to deter workplace deviance is a complex issue.
Examples of early work in this topic are Eaton and White (1982 and 1983), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Akerlof and
Yellen (1986) and Bewley (1999).
6
The rationale for the assumption that   05 will be clear when we analyze the equilibrium. Essentially, this
ensures that there are equilibria in which some people with a deviant record in period 1 are hired in period 2.
7
It would have made no substantial diﬀerence in the results even if we had assumed that  was less than 1 but
greater than  . The implications of relaxing the assumption  = 1 are discussed in section 4.
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explaining the reason for business cycles), therefore, it suﬃces for our purpose to assume the level
of employment in each state as exogenous. However, section 5 endogenizes the hiring choice of
firms and in the concluding section, we argue that the central idea of the paper would still hold if
we had allowed labor demand in period 2 to depend endogenously on the crime rate in period 1.
If employed, an individual can choose to work honestly or indulge in deviant behavior. Throughout the analysis, we use the terms "crime" and "deviant behavior" interchangeably. An unemployed
person cannot commit crime in our model because we consider only on-the-job crimes. In contrast,
an employed person can choose to either commit a crime or to remain innocent in each period. We
denote the set of actions for a generic employed individual by

 = {   }
where  denotes that the individual chose to commit a crime in period  and  denotes a decision
to remain honest in period  If an individual commits a crime, she derives a private benefit of
 ≥ 0 while her payoﬀ is 0 if she chooses to be innocent. The private benefit from crime (which
one may interpret as the individual’s type) is heterogeneously distributed in the population in the
£
¤
interval 0  following the distribution function  () with density function  ().

An individual incurs a cost of   0 in her first crime episode and a cost of 0 in subsequent

episodes (which is a normalization). The cost  can be thought of as a set-up cost of crime. This
framework has similarities with Mocan et al. (2005) who allow individuals to allocate their time
in the acquisition of either legal human capital or criminal human capital. As they note (see p.
660), "individuals become more skilled criminals through learning-by-doing." Deutsch et al. (1990)
provide empirical evidence that there is indeed substantial learning-by-doing in criminal activity.
In our model, we allow an individual to decide whether or not to acquire the criminal human
capital by paying a one-time fee. The set-up cost can also include any emotional cost associated
with committing crime. From the second time onwards, such a set up cost will be lower due to a
lowering of the learning cost or any psychic or emotional cost associated with committing a crime.
Hence, one could have assumed that the fixed cost associated with crime is  1 for the first instance
of crime and  2 for the second instance such that  1   2 . Since  2 would unnecessarily complicate
the analysis, therefore, we assume it to be 0.

7

The employer imperfectly monitors actions in the workplace. Only a fraction of deviant behavior is punished with  ∈ [0 1] being the conviction probability. We assume that the conviction
probability  is exogenous. Such an assumption allows us to demonstrate the main result (that an
increase in the severity of a recession need not lead to an increase in workplace deviance) in the
simplest possible manner. Later on, in the concluding section, we discuss the eﬀect of endogenizing this variable. The monetary value of a convicted person’s punishment is denoted by  . It is
helpful to think of this monetized value as a fine (perhaps in terms of withheld bonuses) though
in the concluding section we discuss what would happen if instead the penalty took the form of
imprisonment.
We assume that the enforcement agency publicly releases the record of a person. We denote the
record of a person by . The record of a person can be "bad" if an employed person is convicted,
or it can be "good" if she has either not committed a crime or has not been caught in an act of
crime and "no record" if a person does not have an employment history. Note once again that an
unemployed person cannot be convicted in a period since we consider only on-the-job crimes.
Recall, in any period, employers hire the entire population in a boom and only a fraction
 in a recession. Employers are profit maximizers and as we explain below, first prefer hiring
previously hired workers with a good record, then prefer hiring previously unemployed persons
and finally prefer previously hired workers with a bad record. Therefore, in the model, the record
(and previous employment status) of a person aﬀects her likelihood of being employed if there is a
recession in period 2. In the discussion of period 2, we provide a rationale for this preference.
The utility of a person in period 2 is given by

2 (2  2  ) = Ω2 [2 + max { − Λ −  0| = 2}]
where Λ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for the first oﬀense and 0 otherwise. Notice
that the term  − Λ −  is the net expected benefit from deviant behavior in period 2 while
the net benefit from remaining innocent in period 2 is 0. Notice that the utility of an unemployed
person in period 2 is 0 since for this person, Ω2 = 0. Similarly, the utility of an employed person
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in period 1 is given by

1 (1  1  ) = Ω1 [1 + max { −  −  0}] + 1 [2 (2  2  ) |Ω1  1 ]

(1)

where 1 [2 (2  2 ) |Ω1  1 ] is the expected utility in period 2 assuming agents take optimal
actions in period 2. The optimal actions will depend on the parameters of the economy and on the
action in period 1.

3

Analysis of Period 2
We first analyze an individual’s optimal behavior in period 2. In period 2, an employed person

commits crime for the first time if and only if expected net benefit from crime is positive

 −  −  ≥ 0
⇔  ≥  +  ≡ 2∗ .
Similarly, an employed person commits crime for the second time in period 2 if
 ≥  ≡ 2∗∗ .
Thus, it follows from the expressions above that 2∗  2∗∗ i.e., the threshold for committing crime
is lower for a person who had already committed a crime previously. This is because such a person
does not have to incur the setup cost of crime again.
In order to complete the analysis for period 2, we need to specify the firm’s preference between
hiring (i) an experienced worker with a good record, (ii) an experienced worker with a bad record,
and (iii) an inexperienced worker.

We assume that a firm prefers (i) over (iii) and (iii) over

(ii). The firm’s preference of (i) over (iii) is consistent with the observation that employers value
experience because previously unemployed workers may have lost some skills due to having been
out of the job market. This is what is called the "scar of unemployment" (Arulampalam (2001)).
As for the comparison between (iii) and (ii), there is a tension between the higher productivity
of an experienced worker (albeit with a bad record) and the higher incentive to indulge in deviant

9

behavior of a person who has already incurred the set up cost. We assume that the latter eﬀect
outweighs the former. In any case, what matters most for our analysis is that the firm prefers an
experienced worker with a good record over an experienced worker with a bad record and the spirit
of the argument would not change if we were to assume that the inexperienced workers are the
least preferred category.

4

Analysis of Period 1
In order to determine 1 , we need to determine the value of 1 [2 (2  2  ) |Ω1  1 ]. It

follows from (1) that the decision of a person to commit crime or to remain honest in period 2
depends on her private benefit  from crime as well as her expected cost of committing crime in
period 1. Note that the expected cost of committing crime in period 1 depends on the expected
employment status in period 2. In order to determine the expected utility of a person in period 2,
we need to first determine the expected value of Ω2 and this is done below.
Let  (1  1 ) be the probability that Ω2 takes a value of 1 in period 2 (that is, it is the
probability that a worker is employed in period 2). In this model,  depends on two factors: (i)
the action of an individual in period 1 since it stochastically aﬀects the individual’s record , and
(ii) the state of the economy in period 1, given by 1 , because it determines the likelihood of the
state of the economy being  or  in period 2. Therefore, the utility in period 1 is given by

1 (1  1  ) = Ω1 [1 + max { −  −  0}] + 1 [2 (2  2  ) |Ω1  1 ]
= Ω1 [1 + max { −  −  0}]
+ (1  1 ) [ + max { − Λ −  0}] +  1  ( −  ) .

(2)

In the right hand side of (2), the first term is the payoﬀ that a person receives in the first period
and the second and third terms capture the continuation payoﬀs. In period 2, the person receives at
least ( + max { − Λ −  0}) if she is employed and an additional wage premium ( −  )
if there is a boom in period 2. The chance of being employed in period 2 is  (1  1 ) and the
chance of a boom is  1  . Hence, the sum of the second and third terms capture the continuation
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payoﬀ in period 2, conditional on information available in period 1 .8
It follows from (2) that if a person commits a crime in period 1 i.e., if 1 = , then the benefit
from the crime is  plus a lowered cost of committing crime next period (i.e.  won’t have to be
incurred next period) while the cost from the crime depends on  +  as well as on the changed
probability of employment because of committing crime in period 1 given by  ( 1 ) −  ( 1 )
which captures the additional benefit of being crime free.
An individual commits a crime in period 1 if her private benefit from crime is greater than or
equal to a threshold level and she does not commit a crime if her private benefit is below that
threshold level. We refer to this threshold level as the marginal criminal type. Let ̃ denote
the marginal criminal type. Then the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) the benefit from
committing crime must be equal to the cost of committing crime of the marginal criminal, (ii) the
benefit from committing crime must be less than the cost of committing crime if the private benefit
is less than the marginal criminal type, and (iii) the benefit from committing crime must be greater
than the cost of committing crime if the private benefit is greater than the marginal criminal type.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. As shown in the diagram, the marginal criminal type ̃ is indiﬀerent
between committing a crime and remaining innocent.
We denote the cost of crime when the benefit is , the marginal criminal is ̃ and the state is
1 by
³
´
≡  +  +  ( 1 ) [ + max { −  −  0}]
∆1  ̃
− ( 1 ) [ + max { −  0}] .

³
´
Note that ∆1  ̃ depends on the parameters    and  as well as the change in probability

of being employed in period 2 for being deviant in period 1. The right hand side of the above

expression will be explained in detail later.
³ ´
Let  ̃ be the proportion of the workforce (or the workers employed in period 1) with a bad

record at the beginning of period 2 given that the marginal criminal type is ̃. Hence, it is given by

the product of the probability of being caught and the probability of having a benefit high enough
8

The fact that employment prospects tomorrow depends on behavior today is consistent with the theory that it
is optimal to treat repeat oﬀenders disadvantageously (see Polinksy and Shavell, 1998).
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Figure 1: This diagram compares the cost of crime with its benefit given that the type of the
marginal criminal is ̃.
to commit crime i.e.

³ ´
h
³ ´i
 ̃ ≡  1 −  ̃ .

Similarly, the proportion of workforce (or the workers employed in period 1) with a good record is
³ ´
1 −  ̃
if the marginal criminal type is ̃. Let the state in period 1 be 1 where 1 =  . Hence, if the
marginal criminal type in period 1 is ̃, then the fraction of the population with no record is

1 − 1 
the fraction of the population with a good record is
³
³ ´´
1 −  ̃ 1 ,

12

while the fraction of the population with a bad record is
³ ´
 ̃ 1 .
We now determine the probability of being employed in period 2.

4.1

Probability of employment in period 2

If there is a boom in period 2, then everyone is employed regardless of record. However, if there
is a recession in period 2, then only a fraction of the population can gain employment and hence, in
this case, a person’s record matters. Suppose there is a recession in period 2. Then, three kinds of
regimes can occur: (a) Only a fraction of the population with a good record is employed (Regime
1), (b) all individuals with a good record are employed and only a fraction of those with no record
are employed (Regime 2), and (c) all individuals with a good record or no record are employed,
while only a fraction of individuals with a bad record are employed (Regime 3). Given the marginal
criminal type ̃, Regime 1 occurs if
³
³ ´´
1 −  ̃ 1 ≥  ,
i.e. the number of people not convicted in period 1 is greater than labor demand in a recession.
Hence, only a fraction of employed people without a criminal record in period 1 are employed
in period 2. Given that these are the most preferred employees, no other category of workers is
employed.
Regime 2 occurs if
³
³ ´´
³
³ ´´
1 −  ̃ 1 + (1 − 1 ) ≥   1 −  ̃ 1 ,
i.e., after employing all workers without a criminal record, only some of the workers unemployed
in period 1 (given by 1 − 1 ) are employed. No convicted person in period 1 is employed in period
2. Regime 3 occurs if

³
³ ´´
  1 −  ̃ 1 + (1 − 1 ) .
13

(3)

i.e., in this case, even some period 1 convicts are hired as labor demand exceeds the number of
people without a record as well as the number of unemployed. In particular, when there is a boom
³
³ ´´
in period 1, then Regime 1 occurs if the marginal criminal type ̃ is such that 1 −  ̃
≥  ,

Regime 2 does not occur at all (since there are no unemployed people in period 1 if it is a boom)
³
³ ´´
³ ´
and Regime 3 occurs if   1 −  ̃ . By definition,  ̃ is a decreasing function of ̃, and
³
³ ´´
hence, 1 −  ̃
is an increasing function of ̃. Therefore, when there is a boom in period 1,
then Regime 1 occurs for relatively high values of ̃ and Regime 3 occurs for relatively low values
of ̃. This is depicted in the upper panel of Figure 2. Further, when there is a recession in period
1, then Regime 1 does not occur at all (since in regime 1 there are no people unemployed in period
³
³ ´´
1), Regime 2 occurs if the marginal criminal type ̃ is such that 1 −  ̃
≥ 2 − 1 and Regime
³
³ ´´
3 occurs if 2 − 1  1 −  ̃ .9 Therefore, when there is a recession in period 1, then Regime
2 occurs for relatively high values of ̃ and Regime 3 occurs for relatively low values of ̃. This is
depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 2.
The probability of being employed in period 2 depends upon the action of an individual in
period 1, the state in period 1 and the appropriate regime in which the equilibrium occurs in

period 1. These probabilities are presented in Table 1. We now explain these probabilities. First,
consider the probability  ( ) of being employed in period 2 if there is a boom in period 1 and an
individual commits a crime in period 1. Such an individual will have a bad record with probability
 and a good record with probability (1 − ). Suppose Regime 1 occurs, that is, during a recession
only a fraction of the individuals with a good record are employed and the others are not employed.
An individual who committed a crime in period 1 will be employed in period 2 only when there
is either a boom in period 2 or a recession in period 2 and this individual was not convicted in
period 1. In the latter case, this individual can be employed only if she is assigned to a job from
amongst the pool of workers with a good record. Conditional on a good record the probability of
being employed is given by the ratio of employment slots ( ) and the number of people with a
³ ´
good record (1 −  ̃ ). The probability of a boom in period 2 is   and the probability of this
individual being employed with a good record during a recession is given by the joint probability

of a recession (  ) and not being caught (1 − ). Thus, the probability of employment if the
9

Note that 2 −

1


≤  because (1 −  )2 ≥ 0.
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Regime 1
Good: Some employed
No record: Does not exist
Bad: None employed

Regime 3
Good: All employed
No record: Does not exist
Bad: Some employed

 


1  B

eL

Regime 3
Good: All employed
No record: All
employed
Bad: Some employed
2

Regime 2:
Good: All employed
No record: Some employed
Bad: None employed


B

 


1  B

1
eL


B

Figure 2: The upper panel shows the diﬀerent regimes when there is a boom in period 1 followed
by a recession in period 2. The bottom panel shows the diﬀerent regimes when there is a recession
in both periods.
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 (1  1 )
 ( )

Regime 2
-

 ( )

Regime 1
  +   (1 − ) 1−̃
( )
  +   1−̃
( )
-

 ( )

-

1

 ( )

1 −   

Regime 3

1 −    1−
(̃ )
1

1 −    1−
(̃ )
1

Table 1: The probability of being employed in period 2 as a function of the action and state in
period 1.
state is  in period 2 conditional on crime in period 1 is given by   (1 − ) 1−̃ . Hence,
( )
 ( ) =   +   (1 − ) 1−̃ under Regime 1. In contrast, under Regime 3, during a
( )
recession, only a fraction of individuals with a bad record are unemployed while the others are
all employed. If an individual commits a crime, then the joint probability of a recession and the
individual having a bad record is   . Notice that the number of "unemployment spots" is
(1 −  ) and these have to be rationed among the number of individuals with a bad record given
³ ´
by  ̃ . Hence, the probability that an individual with a bad record will be unemployed in

and consequently,  ( ) = 1 −    1−
. Similarly, we obtain the other
(̃ )
expressions. The probabilities are plotted as a function of the marginal criminal type in Figure 3.

a recession is

4.2

1−
(̃ )

Equilibrium if there is a boom in period 1

Suppose that there is a boom in period 1. Now consider the decision of an employed worker in
period 1 whose private benefit is  0 . Recall that the marginal criminal type has benefit ̃. If a
person with private benefit  0 decides to commit a crime, then her continuation utility is given by
¡
¢
1    0 =  +  0 −  −  +  (  ) [ + max { −  0}] +   ( −  )
where  (  ) =   +   (1 − ) 1−̃ if the marginal criminal type ̃ belongs to Regime
( )
1−
1 and  (  ) = 1 −     ̃ if the marginal criminal type ̃ belongs to Regime 3. Similarly,
( )
her continuation utility if she decided to remain innocent in period 1 is
¡
¢
1    0 =  +  (  ) [ + max { −  −  0}] +   ( −  ) .
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Regime 1

Regime 3

1

qI, H 

qI, H 

q C, H 

q C, H 

1   HL p

Regime 3


B

Regime 2

q  I , L

1

q  I , L

q  C, L 
q C, L 
1   HL p


B

Figure 3: The upper panel shows the probability of being employed in period 2 if there is a boom in
period 1. The lower panel shows the probability of being employed in period 2 if there is a recession
in period 1.
where  ( ) =   +   1−̃ if the marginal criminal type belongs to Regime 1 and
( )
 ( ) = 1 if the marginal criminal type belongs to Regime 3. Now consider a worker with
private benefit  0  ̃. Such a worker must prefer to commit a crime instead of remaining innocent. Hence the following inequality must hold for  0  ̃:
¡
¢
¡
¢
1    0  1    0 ,
that is,
³
´
£
©
ª¤
 0  ∆  0  ̃ ≡  +  +  (  )  + max  0 −  −  0
©
ª¤
£
− (  )  + max  0 −  0 .

´
³
In the expression above, the term ∆  0  ̃ captures the cost of committing a crime when a

worker has a private benefit of  0 and the marginal criminal type is ̃, given that 1 = . Similarly,

if a worker has private benefit  00  ̃, then she prefers to remain innocent instead of committing
17

a crime, that is the following inequality must hold:
³
´
 00  ∆  00  ̃ .
Finally, if a worker has the private benefit of ̃, then she is indiﬀerent between committing a crime
and remaining innocent. Therefore, the following equality must hold for an employed worker with
type ̃:
³
´
̃ = ∆ ̃ ̃ ≡  + 
n
n
h
oi
h
oi
+ (  )  + max ̃ −  −  0 −  (  )  + max ̃ −  0 ,

(4)

that is, at ̃ the following equality must be satisfied:
³
´
̃ − ∆ ̃ ̃ = 0.
In (4), the term
³ ´
n
n
h
oi
h
oi
 ̃ ≡  (  )  + max ̃ −  −  0 −  (  )  + max ̃ −  0

(5)

is known as the dynamic deterrence eﬀect.10 This eﬀect is the opportunity cost of crime because it
captures the future payoﬀ that a worker has to sacrifice if she commits a crime in period 1.11
We now determine the impact of a change in the labor demand  during a recession on the
dynamic deterrence eﬀect. This allows us to analyze the relationship between the severity of a
recession and the incentives to commit crime. For the discussion below, it will be helpful to use a
notation that captures the marginal criminal’s utility in period 2 if she is employed in period 2 and
is paid the minimum wage of  . Therefore, let 2 (1 ) be the utility of the marginal criminal if
she took an action 1 in period 1, is employed in period 2 and is paid the minimum wage of  .
10

The way the term dynamic deterrence is used is similar in spirit to Imai and Krishna (2004) i.e. ‘current criminal
activity adversely aﬀects future employment outcomes’. See discussion in the concluding section for the traeoﬀ this
implies in terms of optimal punishment.
11
Notice that in our model, an individual worker is insignificant compared to the entire workforce; hence, each
worker takes the crime rate as given and determines her optimal action. This would not have been the case if we had
considered deviant behavior by unions, such as strikes. The reason is that unions would have the power to shift the
equilibrium crime rate, while an individual worker takes the crime rate as given.
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Thus,

n
o
2 (1 = ) =  + max ̃ −  0

denotes the utility of the marginal criminal in period 2 if she is hired in period 2 but had committed
a crime in period 1, while

2 (1 = ) =  + max { −  −  0}
denotes the utility of the marginal criminal in period 2 if she is hired in period 2 and if she had not
committed a crime in period 1.
³ ´
The expression for  ̃ given above is not very convenient for our purpose. Hence, we

manipulate the expression in (5) and obtain the following decomposition:
³ ´
 ̃
= { (  ) −  (  )} 2 (1 = )

− (  ) {2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = )} .

(6)

Notice that the terms  (  ),  (  ) −  (  ), 2 (1 = ) and
2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = )

(7)

are all non-negative. To explain briefly,  (  ) −  (  ) is the change in probability of employment conditional on an unblemished record in period 1 while

2 (1 = )

is the net utility in a single period for a person contemplating crime for the first time. Thus,
{ (  ) −  (  )} 2 (1 = ) is (proportional to) the net benefit of staying crime free in
period 1 in terms of utility obtained in period 2, i.e., it is the increased probability of employment
conditional on not committing crime multiplied by the utility of a person who does not commit
crime in period 1. On the other hand, by not committing crime, the worker forgoes an advantage
in terms of lowered second period utility as she has to pay an additional cost in period 2 if she
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commits a crime in period 2. That is captured by

 (  ) {2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = )} 
Thus the net benefit of staying crime free depends on the improved probability of employment and
the increased cost of committing crime in the second period.
4.2.1

Impact of a decrease in the severity of a recession

We now consider the impact of a decrease in the severity of a recession. In our model, this is
captured by an increase in the labor demand during a recession  from 0 to 1 ; 1  0 . Consider
the upper panel of Figure 2. Notice that the boundary between the regimes is determined by the
³ ´
intersection of 1 −  ̃ and  . Therefore, if  goes up from 0 to 1 , the boundary shifts to
e and notice that any of three possible outcomes can occur because of
the right. Pick a value of 

the rightward shift of the boundary between Regime 1 and Regime 3: The marginal criminal type
e lies (a) to the right of the boundary (in Regime 1) both for  = 0 as well as for  = 1 , (b)




to the left of the boundary (in Regime 3) both for  = 0

as well as for  = 1 , and (c) to the

right of the boundary (in Regime 1) for  = 0 and to the left of the boundary (in Regime 3) for
 = 1 . Observe that an increase in  leads to a regime change only for the third case. We now
³
´
analyze how ∆  ̃ changes in response to an increase in  .
e changes but the equilibrium
First consider (a). In this case, the marginal criminal type 

remains in Regime 1 both for  = 0 as well as for  = 1 . Suppose a person decides to remain
innocent at some level of benefit . Then there are two impacts on her continuation utility: (i) She
has a higher probability of being employed in period 2. (ii) Conditional on being employed, the

utility of an innocent person in period 2 is less than the utility of a criminal (that occurs because
of the set up cost of crime, given by  ).
In Regime 1, an increase in  increases  ( ) but it increases  ( ) by more. Hence,
if we are in Regime 1 both before and after a change in  , then an increase in  leads to an
increase of both  (  ) and  (  ) −  (  ). An increase in  (  ) −  (  ) implies
that the additional probability of being hired in period 2 conditional on having a good record (as
opposed to a bad record) increases and this enhances (i) mentioned above. Therefore, following
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(6), an increase in  (  ) −  (  ) increases the incentive to stay innocent in period 1 by
increasing dynamic deterrence.

There is however a second eﬀect described by (ii) above that

dampens dynamic deterrence. To see this, notice that a person who remained innocent in period
1 is at a disadvantage in period 2 compared to a person who committed a crime previously. The
magnitude of this disadvantage is given by (7). An increase in  leads to an increase in  ( )
which is the weight on the disadvantage factor and this enhances the power of (ii). Consequently,
following (6), an increase in  (  ) increases the incentive to commit a crime in period 1 by
decreasing dynamic deterrence.12 In summary, in this case, the incentive to commit crime can go
either way.
We now consider (b), that is the case in which the equilibrium is Regime 3 both for  = 0 as
well as for  = 1 . In this case, an increase in  increases  ( ) and has no impact on  ( ).
As discussed above, a decrease in  (  )− (  ) decreases the incentive to remain innocent in
period 1 and an increase in  ( ) reinforces the same eﬀect. Hence, dynamic deterrence decreases
³
´
and this decreases ∆  ̃ . Hence, the cutoﬀ value of  for the marginal criminal type goes
down unambiguously. This implies that in this case, a reduction in the severity of a recession leads
to an increase in crime.
Finally, we consider (c), that is the case in which one shifts from Regime 1 for  = 0 to
Regime 3 for  = 1 . In this case,  (  ) changes from
  +   (1 − )

0
³ ´
1 −  ̃

to

Observe from Figure 3 that

0
1−(̃ )

1 − 1
1 −    ³ ´
.
 ̃
 1 because 0 belongs to Regime 1. Further, since 1 belongs

12

Note, we are interested in the dynamic deterrence eﬀect or the incentive to commit crime rather than the crime
rate as changes in employment aﬀect the total number of employed workers so the number of people who commit
crime could (for example) increase because there are more people who can commit on the job crime if  has increased
 goes up.
even if the incentive to commit crime goes down i.e. 
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to Regime 3, therefore,

1
1−(̃ )

 1 from which it follows that

1−1
(̃ )

 1 as well. Hence, let

0
³ ´ = 1 − 0; 0  0
1 −  ̃
and
1 − 1
³ ´ = 1 − 1; 1  0
 ̃

Therefore, the change in  (  ) is given by

⎧
⎫ ⎧
⎫
⎨
⎬
⎬
⎨
1
0
1 − 

³ ´
1 −    ³ ´
−   +   (1 − )
⎩
 ̃ ⎭ ⎩
1 −  ̃ ⎭

= {1 −    (1 − 1 )} − {  +   (1 − ) (1 − 0 )}
=   {(1 − ) 0 + 1 }  0.

Hence, an increase in  leads to an increase in  (  ) and this decreases the dynamic deterrence
eﬀect. The corresponding change for  (  ) is given by

1 −   −  
=   0  0.

0
³ ´
1 −  ̃

Hence, the change in  (  ) −  (  ) is given by
  0 −   {(1 − ) 0 + 1 }
=    (0 − 1 ) .
Notice that the above expression has an ambiguous sign. If this is negative, then the dynamic
deterrence eﬀect goes down unambiguously. However, the expression above can be positive as well
in which case the net impact on dynamic deterrence can be positive. To summarize, if 0 is such
that the equilibrium is Regime 1 and 1 is such that the equilibrium is Regime 3, then a reduction
in the severity of the recession has an ambiguous eﬀect on crime.
The following proposition summarizes the three cases discussed above.
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Proposition 1 Suppose there is a boom in period 1. (a) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 1 both
before and after an increase in  , the net impact on crime can go either way. (b) If the equilibrium
belongs to regime 3 both before and after an increase in  , then it increases the incentive to commit
crime. (c) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 1 to begin with and after an increase in  it moves
to regime 3, then an increase in  can cause crime to go either way.
It is also interesting to examine how Proposition 1 would change if the set-up cost of crime 
was assumed to be 0. In order to determine the answer to this question, first note from (7) that

2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = ) = 0
whenever  = 0. Hence, in this case,
³ ´
 ̃ = { (  ) −  (  )} 2 (1 = ) .
When  increases, then 2 (1 = ) does not change but  (  ) −  (  ) does. Therefore, by
applying similar reasoning as above, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Suppose  = 0. Also let there be a boom in period 1. (a) If the equilibrium belongs to
regime 1 both before and after an increase in  , then it decreases the incentive to commit crime.
(b) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 3 both before and after an increase in  , then it increases
the incentive to commit crime. (c) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 1 to begin with and after an
increase in  it moves to regime 3, then an increase in  can cause crime to go either way.
When  = 0, then we have a sharper prediction in case (a). Thus, when  = 0, the impact on
crime is unambiguous within a regime, but this is not the case across regimes, because an increase
in  changes the incentive to commit crime quite diﬀerently in cases (a) and (b). In addition, the
result in (c) stays the same even when  = 0.
4.2.2

Impact of a diﬀerential treatment of workers based upon past record

One possibility that has not been considered so far is that in period 2, firms may treat workers
diﬀerently depending upon their past record. Indeed, one may expect an employer to pay less to a
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worker who has a bad record in period 1, or to monitor such a worker more stringently, or to impose
a higher fine on a repeat oﬀender. The ultimate impact of such a policy is to reduce 2 (1 = )
compared to what we obtained in the section above. For small reductions in 2 (1 = ), we will
still have 2 (1 = )  2 (1 = ) as in the sections above, and Proposition 1 continues to hold.
The interesting change occurs when 2 (1 = )  2 (1 = ). This assumption is maintained
only for the remainder of this subsection. To analyze this case, it is convenient to re-write the
³ ´
dynamic deterrence term  ̃ as follows:
³ ´
 ̃
= { (  ) −  (  )} 2 (1 = )

+ (  ) {2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = )} .

We now examine how the marginal criminal type ̃ changes with an increase in  from 0 to
1 . Notice that a change in  changes only the terms ( (  ) −  (  )) and  (  ).
e changes but the
Now consider Case (a) as above. In this case, the marginal criminal type 
equilibrium is Regime 1 both for  = 0 as well as for  = 1 . Note that an increase in 

leads to an increase of both  (  ) and ( (  ) −  (  )), and consequently, the dynamic
e increases and the incentive to commit crime goes down
deterrence eﬀect increases. Consequently, 

unambiguously. This is similar to the result obtained in Corollary 1 (but diﬀerent from Proposition
1). Next, consider (b), that is the case in which the equilibrium is Regime 3 both for  = 0

as

well as for  = 1 . In this case, an increase in  increases  ( ) but  (  ) remains constant.
Consequently, the dynamic deterrence eﬀect goes down and the incentive to commit crime increases
unambiguously.13 This is same as the result obtained in Proposition 1 (and Corollary 1). Finally,
consider (c), that is the case in which one shifts from Regime 1 for  = 0 to Regime 3 for  = 1 .
In this case, there is an increase in  (  ) but the eﬀect on ( (  ) −  (  )) is ambiguous.
Hence, a decrease in the severity of the recession may shift the incentive to commit crime either
way. This is also same as in Proposition 1 (and Corollary 1). In summary, a decrease in the severity
of a recession can have an ambiguous eﬀect on the incentive to commit crime, even if firms treat
workers with a bad record more harshly.
13

The easiest way to draw this conclusion is by observing (5).

24

4.2.3

Impact of an increase in optimism

We now consider an increase in optimism about the future, given that there is a boom in period
1. In our model, an increase in optimism given that 1 =  is captured by an increase in   from
 0 to  1 ;  1   0 . Notice that this leads to a decrease in   from  0 to  1 ;  1 
 0 , because   +   = 1. Recall that the boundary between the regimes is determined by the
³ ´
intersection of 1 −  ̃ and  . Hence, there cannot be any regime change in this case because
an increase in   does not shift the boundary. Therefore, we consider two cases in which the

marginal criminal type lies to the (a) right of the boundary in Regime 1 or (b) to the left of the
boundary in Regime 3.
First, consider the case in which the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 1. To analyze this
case, note that


1−(̃ )

 1 in Regime 1. Hence, an increase in   and a corresponding decrease

in   leads to an increase in  (  ) and this increases the incentive to commit crime. Further,
 (  ) −  (  ) is given by    1−̃ and this decreases because of the reduction in   .
( )
Note that the latter eﬀect also works in the same direction. Hence, an increase in   increases
crime by reducing dynamic deterrence.
Next, consider the case in which the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 3. In this case, an
increase in   and a corresponding decrease in   leads to an increase in  (  ) and this
increases the incentive to commit crime. It can also be checked that  (  ) −  (  ) goes
down as well and this also reinforces the incentive to commit crime. Hence, in this case also, an
increase in   increases crime by reducing dynamic deterrence.
We summarize these findings below.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is a boom in period 1. An increase in optimism leads to an increase
in crime.
The key reason why Proposition 2 holds is that in our model,
 (  )
 max
 

½

¾
 (  )
0 .
 

(8)

The above inequality means that an increase in optimism about the future benefits workers who
commit a crime more than workers who choose to remain innocent. As long as (8) holds, Proposition
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2 will continue to hold. However, the result can be overturned if that is not the case. To examine
this issue, it is instructive to consider a slightly altered model than the one considered in the paper.
In this altered model, assume that if there is a boom in period 2, then workers with a good record
still find employment in period 2 with probability 1 but those with a bad record are employed in
³ ´
period 2 with probability  ̃ ;  (·) ≤ 1.
Suppose the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 1. Then,

h
³ ´i
 (  ) =   (1 − ) +  ̃ +   (1 − )


³ ´
1 −  ̃

and
 (  ) =   +  
Therefore,

³
³ ´´
 (  ) −  (  ) =    1 −  ̃ +   

It then follows that

and


³ ´.
1 −  ̃

³ ´.
1 −  ̃

⎤
⎡
³
´
 (  )

³ ´⎦
=  ̃ + (1 − ) ⎣1 −
 
1 −  ̃
⎡

⎤
³
´

 (  )  (  )
³ ´⎦ .
−
=  ⎣1 −  ̃ −
 
 
1 −  ̃

(9)

(10)

 )
 0. However, the expression in (10) has an indeterminate sign.
It follows from (9) that (
 
³ ´
If  ̃ is close enough to 1, then (10) is negative and (8) is satisfied. Consequently Proposition
³ ´
2 continues to hold. However, if  ̃ is suﬃciently smaller than 1, then (10) can be positive. In

this case (8) is violated and the eﬀect of an increase in optimism on the incentive to commit crime
can go either way. A similar conclusion holds if the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 3.

4.3

Equilibrium if there is a recession in period 1

Suppose there is a recession in period 1. As before, let the marginal criminal type be ̃. If
a worker has the private benefit of ̃, then she is indiﬀerent between committing a crime and
remaining innocent. Therefore, the following inequality must hold for an employed worker with
26

type ̃:
³
´
̃ = ∆ ̃ ̃ ≡  + 

(11)

+ (  ) 2 (1 = ) −  (  ) 2 (1 = ) .

As before for ̃ to be the marginal criminal it must be that:
³
´
̃ − ∆ ̃ ̃ = 0.
In (11), the term

³ ´
 ̃ ≡  (  ) 2 (1 = ) −  (  ) 2 (1 = )

(12)

is the dynamic deterrence eﬀect. We determine the impact of a reduction in the severity of a
recession on the dynamic deterrence eﬀect. To do so, we manipulate the expression in (12) and
obtain the following decomposition:
³ ´
 ̃ = { (  ) −  (  )} 2 (1 = )
− (  ) {2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = )} .

Notice that the terms  (  ),  (  ) −  (  ), 2 (1 = ) and
2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = )
are all non-negative.
4.3.1

Impact of a decrease in the severity of a recession

We now consider the impact of a decrease in the severity of a recession. As before, this is
captured by an increase in the labor demand during a recession  from 0 to 1 ; 1  0 . As
discussed immediately after (3), the boundary between the regimes is determined by the intersection
³ ´
of 1− ̃ and 2− 1 . Therefore, if  goes up from 0 to 1 , the boundary shifts to the right. Pick
e and notice that any of three possible outcomes can occur because of the rightward shift
a value of 
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of the boundary between Regime 2 and Regime 3: The candidate value of the marginal criminal
e lies (a) to the right of the boundary (in Regime 2) both for  = 0 as well as for  = 1 ,
type 


(b) to the left of the boundary (in Regime 3) both for  = 0 as well as for  = 1 , and (c) to

the right of the boundary (in Regime 2) for  = 0 and to the left of the boundary (in Regime
3) for  = 1 . Observe that an increase in  leads to a regime change only for the third case.
³
´
Below, we consider how ∆  ̃ changes in response to an increase in  .

First consider (a). In this case, the equilibrium belongs to Regime 2 both for  = 0 as well

as for  = 1 . In Regime 2, an increase in  has no impact on either  ( ) or on  ( ).
Hence, if the marginal criminal type belongs to Regime 2, then an increase in  has no impact on
³
´
∆  ̃ and hence, there is no change in the equilibrium level of the marginal criminal type.

Consequently, in this case, a decrease in the severity of a recession has no impact on crime.
We now consider (b), that is the case in which we are in Regime 3 both for  = 0

as well

as for  = 1 . In this case, an increase in  increases  ( ) but has no impact on  ( ).
As discussed above, a decrease in  (  ) −  (  ) decreases the incentive to remain innocent
in period 1. Further, an increase in  ( ) reinforces the same eﬀect. Hence, dynamic deterrence
³
´
decreases and this decreases ∆  ̃ . Consequently, the equilibrium level of the marginal

criminal type goes down unambiguously, that is, crime (adjusted for employment level) increases.

Finally, we consider (c), that is the case in which the equilibrium is in Regime 2 for  = 0
and shifts to Regime 3 for  = 1 . This implies that when  increases from 0 to 1 , then
 (  ) −  (  ) changes from
  
to
1 − 1
   ³ ´ .
 ̃ 1
Observe from Figure 3 that since 1 belongs to Regime 3, therefore, 2 −
which it follows that

1−1
(̃ )1

1


³
³ ´´
 1 −  ̃ , from

 1. This implies that  (  ) −  (  ) decreases when  increases

from 0 to 1 and this decreases the incentive to remain innocent in period 1. Further,  (  )
increases from
1 −   
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to
1 − 1
1 −    ³ ´
 ̃ 1

and this reinforces the same eﬀect. Therefore, when  increases from 0 to 1 , then dynamic
³
´
deterrence decreases and this decreases ∆  ̃ . Consequently, the marginal criminal type i.e.

̃ goes down unambiguously. To summarize, if 0 belongs to Regime 2 and 1 belongs to Regime
3, then a reduction in the severity of the recession increases crime (adjusted for employment level).
We summarize the analysis with the following proposition
Proposition 3 Suppose there is a recession in period 1. (a) If the equilibrium belongs to regime
2 both before and after an increase in  , then there is no impact on crime. (b) If the equilibrium
belongs to regime 3 both before and after a change in  , then an increase in  increases crime
(adjusted for the level of employment in period 1). (c) If the equilibrium belongs to regime 2 to
begin with and after a change in  it moves to regime 3, then an increase in  increases crime
(adjusted for the level of employment in period 1).
4.3.2

Impact of an increase in optimism

We now consider an increase in optimism about the future, given that there is a recession in
period 1. In our model, an increase in optimism given that 1 =  is captured by an increase in
  from  0 to  1 ;  1   0 . Notice that this leads to a decrease in   from  0 to  1 ;
 1   0 , because   +   = 1. Recall that the boundary between the regimes is determined
³ ´
by the intersection of 1 −  ̃ and 2 − 1 . Hence, there cannot be any regime change in this case
because an increase in   does not shift the boundary. Therefore, we consider two cases in which
the marginal criminal type lies to the (a) right of the boundary in Regime 2 or (b) to the left of
the boundary in Regime 3.
First, consider the case in which the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 2. In this case, a
decrease in   leads to an increase in  (  ) and this increases the incentive to commit crime.
Further,  (  ) −  (  ) is given by    and this decreases. Note that the latter eﬀect
also works in the same direction. Hence, an increase in   increases crime by reducing dynamic
deterrence.
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Next, consider the case in which the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 3. In this case, a
decrease in   leads to an increase in  (  ) and this increases the incentive to commit crime.
It can also be checked that  (  ) −  (  ) goes down as well and this also reinforces the
incentive to commit crime. Hence, in this case also, an increase in   increases crime by reducing
dynamic deterrence.
We summarize these findings below.
Proposition 4 Suppose there is a recession in period 1. An increase in optimism leads to an
increase in crime.
As in Proposition 2, one can see that the key reason why Proposition 4 holds is that in our
model,
 (  )
 max
 

½

¾
 (  )
0 .
 

(13)

The above inequality means that an increase in optimism about the future benefits workers who
commit a crime more than workers who choose to remain innocent. As long as (13) holds, Proposition 4 will continue to hold. However, the result can be overturned if that is not the case. In order
to show this, consider the altered model described after Proposition 2. In that altered model, it is
assumed that if there is a boom in period 2, then workers with a good record still find employment
in period 2 with probability 1 but those with a bad record are employed in period 2 with probability
³ ´
 ̃ ;  (·) ≤ 1.
Suppose the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 3. Then, it can be shown that
⎡

⎤
³
´
 (  )
1 − 
=  ⎣ ̃ + ³ ´
− 1⎦
 
 ̃ 

(14)

and
 (  )
= 0.
 
³ ´
has an indeterminate sign. If  ̃ is close enough to 1, then
³ ´
(14) is positive and therefore (13) is satisfied. Consequently, Proposition 4 holds. However, if  ̃

It follows from (14) that

(  )
 

is suﬃciently smaller than 1, then (14) is negative. In this case (13) is violated and an increase

in optimism decreases the the incentive to commit crime. Hence, the crime rate goes down in this
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case. It can also be shown that if the marginal criminal type lies in Regime 2, then Proposition 4
continues to hold even with the altered model.

5

Robustness Checks: Endogenizing the employment decision
In the discussion above, the decision making process of the firms were not explicitly modeled. In

this section, we therefore endogenize the employment decision of the firms and consider its impact
on the main results of the paper.
Consider a perfectly competitive industry with a large number of identical firms. For this
industry, the (inverse) demand curve is
=−
and the supply curve is
 =  + .
Hence, in equilibrium, the price and aggregate quantity are
∗ =

1
1
( − ) and ∗ = ( + ) .
2
2

The parameter  varies according to the state of the economy. In particular, it takes a value of 
during a boom and  during a recession;    . Each worker produces one unit of output.
In each period, the aggregate employment depends on the state of the economy in that period
and the record of the workers. Consider period 1. The gross value of marginal product (excluding
deviance costs) of each worker is
1
(1 − )
2
where 1 is the state in period 1. In this period, all workers are identical since none of them have
any record. However, the firms can anticipate that the probability that a worker will engage in
³ ´
deviant behavior in period 1 is  ̃ . Suppose a firm incurs a loss of  for each instance of
deviance. Then, the net value of marginal product of a worker in period 1 is
³ ´
1
(1 − ) −  ̃ .
2
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The net value of marginal product curve is depicted by the horizontal lines in Figure 4. The supply
curve of labor is determined by a function  () where  is the level of employment. The labor
supply curve is determined by the labor leisure choice of individual workers; 0 ()  0.
The employment in the economy is determined by the intersection of the net marginal product
curve and the labor supply curve. We assume that

 ≥  + 2 ( +  (1)) .

(15)

This ensures that everyone (including those with a bad record) is employed if there is a boom in
period 1, that is,

³
´
1  ̃ = 1.

If there is a recession in period 1, then it follows from Figure 4 that some workers are unemployed
and the rate of employment depends positively on ̃, that is
³
´
³
´
1  ̃
1  ̃  1 and
 0.
 ̃

³
´
Let 1 1  ̃ denote the wage rate in period 1 if the state is 1 and the marginal criminal type is

̃. Notice that

³
´
1 1  ̃
 ̃

 0,

that is, in period 1, the wage rate decreases with the incentive to commit crime. This is diﬀerent
from the previous model with exogenous firms because that model assumes that the wage rate
depends on the state of the economy but not the crime rate.
Now consider period 2. The net value of marginal product in period 2 is a step function. This
function attains its highest value for experienced workers with a good record, followed by inexperienced workers, followed by experienced workers with a bad record. The wage rate is determined by
the intersection of the wage schedule with the net value of marginal product schedule. As long as
(15) holds, it can be shown that everyone will be employed if there is a boom in period 2. Following
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Figure 4: The net value of marginal product of a firm is given by the horizontal line whose height
depends on the state of the economy. The supply curve of labor is given by  ().
similar lines, it can be shown that
³
´
³
´
2  ̃
0
2  ̃  1,
 ̃
and

³
´
2 2  ̃
 ̃

 0.

In period 2, the employment rate in a recession as well as the wage rate depends on the marginal
criminal types in both periods. However, the marginal criminal type in period 2 will have no role to
play in the analysis, therefore, we suppress it. In this model, the wage rates in the two periods can
be diﬀerent, even for the same state. This model will also require a modification of Figure 2 because
³
´
2  ̃ is now an increasing function of ̃, instead of being a constant function. However, there

are still two regimes (for each initial state). A decrease in the severity of a recession in this model
is captured by an increase in  and we show below that in this model, such a change has similar

eﬀects as in Propositions 1 and 3.
Suppose there is a boom in period 1. In this model, the dynamic deterrence eﬀect is still given
by a similar expression as (6) with the diﬀerences being as follows: (i) In the expressions for 2 (·),
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³
´
we replace  with 2  ̃ , and (ii) in the expressions for  (  ) and  (  ), we replace
³
´
 with 2  ̃ .
First, consider the case in which the equilibrium is Regime 1 before and after the increase
³
´
³
´
in  . An increase in  increases 2  ̃ and 2  ̃ . These changes in turn increase
( (  ) −  (  )),  (  ), and 2 (1 = ) but leaves [(2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = ))] un-

changed. Hence, it follows that both terms of the dynamic deterrence eﬀect (6) increase. Consequently, the net eﬀect of an increase in  can go either way. This result is same as in Proposition
1.
Next, consider the case in which the equilibrium is Regime 3 before and after the increase in
 . An increase in  decreases ( (  ) −  (  )), increase  (  ) and 2 (1 = ) but
leaves [(2 (1 = ) − 2 (1 = ))] unchanged. Hence, it follows that second term of the dynamic
deterrence eﬀect (6) increases, while the first term can go either way. Consequently, the net eﬀect
of an increase in  in this case can go either way. This result diﬀers from Proposition 1 but it is
consistent with the central idea of the paper that a decrease in the severity of a recession can cause
the incentive to commit crime go either way.
One can similarly derive the eﬀect of an increase in  when there is a regime change.

6

Extensions and concluding remarks
We have presented an intertemporal model of workplace deviance or on-the-job criminal behav-

ior to analyze the way this varies with the state of the economy. There is a dearth of theoretical
work in this area which tries to model workplace deviant behavior in relation to the state of the
economy. Even the empirical literature is limited in this area and the little information that we have
via managerial interviews (as mentioned in the introduction) has contradictory findings with some
suggesting shirking increases in a recession while others believe that it decreases. This paper fills
a void in the literature by modeling this phenomenon and finds that the relationship is ambiguous
and whether deviant behavior goes up or down in a recession depends on the strength of competing
eﬀects.
It is plausible that deviant behavior in the workplace aﬀects labor productivity. One example
of deviant behavior is shirking. If there is an increase in shirking, then this decreases the average

34

productivity of workers. Similarly, other kinds of deviant behavior such as bullying is not conducive
for a productive working environment. This paper demonstrates that the decision to be deviant
which aﬀects productivity of workers depends non-monotonically on the state of the economy. Our
results are robust to endogenous hiring choice by firms.
A number of assumptions were made in the model. We briefly discuss the implications of
relaxing them for our results. First, we assume that the conviction probability is exogenous. Let us
consider very briefly the eﬀect of endogenizing the variable. One can conjecture that an employer
is likely to expend more resources on monitoring when the equilibrium crime rate is high (that is
³ ´
when ̃ is low) and vice-versa. Thus, it must be the case that 0 ̃  0. By definition, the
proportion of workers with a bad record is given by

³ ´
³ ´h
³ ´i
 ̃ ≡  ̃ 1 −  ̃
and this term will still be negatively related with ̃ although the absolute value of the slope will
³ ´
be greater when we allow for an endogenous  ̃ . In terms of Figure 2, this means that the size

of Regime 3 will shrink. However, there will still be two regimes and we will still obtain the result
that an increase in the severity of a recession need not lead to an increase in workplace deviance.

Further, we assume that the penalty for crime takes the form of a fine. In reality, the punishment
could also be in the form of imprisonment that renders the convict inactive next period. This would
imply that the attractiveness of crime would go down if there is a decrease in the severity of the
recession (or equivalently, an increase in  ). However, that does not substantially change the
incentives in comparison with a fine of equivalent disutility. As before, it depends on the regime.
If one is in regime 1 or 2, then an increase in  which does not change the regime makes no
diﬀerence to the marginal criminal as they remain unemployed if caught. So there is no additional
disincentive from being in prison (and hence being inactive in the labor market). The incentive for
the marginal case would change if one is in regime 3 in which case some people with bad records
are hired. In such a case, the attractiveness of employment in terms of an increase in  decreases
crime. Of course, if imprisonment of criminals causes a labor deficit, wages would rise which would
in turn increase the value to being innocent.
It is worth noting that though we look at on-the-job crime, the channel via which people without
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a criminal record face diﬀerent probabilities of employment aﬀect other types of crime including
that committed by unemployed people. Unemployed people also face a choice similar to the worker
in our model, when facing a crime opportunity  he has to consider not just the ‘static’ eﬀect of
being caught today but the decreased probability this will have on his employment in the future.
Again, in a recession employers can be more choosy and thus anticipation of recession may cause
dynamic deterrence to increase for the unemployed similar to the employed worker. Indeed, there is
suggestive evidence that crime in general may have fallen during the current recession. For instance,
an article in the Guardian (Travis (2010)) reports that crime has reduced in the UK in recent years
in spite of the recession although it was widely feared that it would go up. Dynamic deterrence may
be one possible explanation of this phenomenon. One can thus look at how unemployed people face
diﬀerent probabilities of employment in diﬀerent regimes and show changes that aﬀect the incentive
to commit crime when  changes. While we model the decision making of perfectly competitive
firms (who face productivity losses from deviant behavior) in section 5, one can also look at how
incentives in terms of penalties and dismissal should optimally vary across the business cycle to
find out if, for example, a ‘firing policy’ conditional on crime in period 1 induces higher profits by
lowering deviant behavior and how such policy changes across the business cycle14 . Thus, we can
formally model how the optimal personnel decisions of firms should vary with market conditions15 .
Finally, as the severity of recession determines the relationship between crime and the state of
the economy one can look at sectors which are more or less aﬀected by recession and use data on
some measure of shirking (such as sickness absence) or workplace deviance (perhaps measured by
employee theft) to test our hypotheses about how these vary with the business cycle. It should
be noted that contradictory findings from empirical studies across diﬀerent time periods should
not surprise us as our model predicts that the relationship may go either way and depends on the
relative severity of the recession.
Finally, future work can consider how the ‘state of the economy’ i.e. how severe the recession
is coupled with firm specific shocks (e.g. two otherwise identical firms end up with higher or lower
number of deviant types) can explain the entry and exit process of firms. Several papers analyze
14

See Dickens, Katz, Lang and Summers (1989) for work on optimal monitoring and penalty to deter on the job
crime, though not in the context of business cycles.
15
A similar issue arises when we consider the issue of recidivism and rehabilitation. There is interesting research
on the impact of human capital development of prisoners to improve their (post-release) labor market opportunities
but, which consequently, aﬀects the deterrent eﬀect (see for example, Imai and Krishna, 2004).
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this process with regards to firm specific productivity shocks (e.g. Jovanovic, 1982, Hopenhayn,
1992). Interaction with the state of the economy may oﬀer more insights into when entry and exit
of firms occur with regards to demand conditions. This is left for future research.
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